

SEMINAR ON
THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER AND SMALL UNIT STRUCTURE

1. Introduction:

You should have at this point a fair knowledge of the theory and substance of the historical structure, organization, (with certain elements of this structure in more detail, i.e. uniforms, insignia, ordnance) of the various Communist Armed Forces. Academically what you have done is to take the whole vast structure and arbitrarily pin-point certain elements which seem to have equal importance in relation to the orientation framework of this first week. This is one of the easiest ways of approaching any subject in that it allows the instructor to impose certain convenient categories. At this point, however, your entire knowledge must be turned upside down and considered from a new point of view. Any structure - whether it be an office building, a bridge, or a mathematical theory - there is one element which creates and controls this structure: the human being - his behaviour and his effective intelligence. Now in any large structure, such as an office building, the creating and controlling factors become decentralized. The architect, the engineers, etc. all contribute and the success of completion depends on the interaction of the behaviour and effective intelligence of the individuals involved. Certainly this is true in CIA, where it is impossible for anyone man to have complete creativeness and complete control. These functions devolve down administratively and operationally to all levels and these functions are successful only when there is a positive interaction at all levels - otherwise there is the usual snafu. Now in the various Communist Armed Forces - considering them as an administrative and operational structure - the same theory applies. The individual and collective behaviour and effective intelligence of a Russian private, officer, or squad will determine in any one instant the success or failure of the creative and controlling factors involved in the structure called the Soviet Armed Forces. Today we are going to determine, if possible, the general pattern of behaviour and effective intelligence demanded of the Russian and Chinese private, officer, or squad. This pattern seems to breakdown roughly into three ideas:

- a. The discipline elements and control factors.
- b. The educational, recruitment, and training factors.
- c. The apparent elements of general cultural behaviour patterns.

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Before launching into specifics, one additional fact should be kept in mind that in all large administrative and operational structures - such as CIA or the Soviet Armed Forces - certain ground rules come into being to control the interaction of individuals and groups within the structure in order to insure positive teamwork toward a predetermined goal. Finally keep in mind that various facets of the predetermined goal may shift in emphasis, thereby changing the ground rules. An example of this would be the non-fraternization order issued by the Russian occupation forces in Germany in 1948.

2. Discipline Elements:

The factor of discipline can be broken down, in turn, into two factors: Positive discipline and Negative discipline.

a. Positive discipline can be defined as follows: it is that discipline which states the reason for such and such an order being given, and rationalizes the punishment that will be given if the rule is broken to the effect that an infraction of the rule will be harmful not only to the individual but to the group as a whole.

b. Negative discipline can be defined as follows: it is that discipline which states no reason for such and such an order being given, and if the rule is broken the punishment is up to the discretion of the controlling individual. The punishment is not known at the time of the order.

There is no place in this discussion to go into the moral aspects of positive and negative discipline. If any of you have families, you will be familiar with the problem.

Now discipline in any Armed Force can be applied either positively or negatively or both, and in this day and age it can be applied through two different mediums: political or military or both.

i. Discipline (either positive or negative or both) may be applied to an individual soldier or a small unit through political (economic) controls.

ii. Discipline (either positive or negative or both) may be applied to an individual soldier or a small unit through purely military controls.

Through an analysis of this chart (Discipline Factors Chart) we can bring this theoretical discussion down to earth.

3. Application of Discipline:

By setting this up as a kind of graph, with Military discipline (or adherence) on one leg and Political discipline (or adherence) on the other leg, a kind of graph can be shown - which admittedly is very rough and general and in some cases open to discussion - comparing various armies of various nations. Actually if some time could be spent on this particular comparative problem, the same rough conclusions might be reached by analyzing the historical developments of various national armies, in terms of each nation's internal and external political-economic aims. If you can remember some of the theoretical elements discussed on the first day, it might help here.

a. Now the American Army uses in most cases a positive military discipline. There are a set of ground rules, so to speak, which every recruit is made aware of. This recruit is also made aware of the punishments that result from an infraction of these rules. These are military rules. It does not matter one iota whether or not the recruit is a Republican or Democrat; however, more and more the American Army is being almost forced to explain the why's and wherefore's of their strategy and tactics in terms of United States policy. There is a very definite attempt to make the individual soldier have some political awareness; therefore the soldier adheres to the military discipline because - as the Army tries to point out - that it is politic to do so. He is told today directly and indirectly about the evils of Communism and Fascism and that he is in the Army, part of the team, to combat these evils.

b. In contrast to the American Army the French Foreign Legion, an extreme, is complete apolitical. It demands adherence on the part of the individual soldier completely on military grounds. It is a completely professional army. It might be compared to the Hessian troops who fought for the British in the American Revolution.

c. The Chinese Communist Army, however, uses a medium of politics almost completely to discipline the individual soldier. Through a method of continuous political indoctrination, discipline is effected by making demands on the individual soldier's political activism.

d. The Soviet Army is interesting in that during the Civil War 1918-1922, it was very similar to the present day Chinese Communist Army while today it is fast approaching the Old Imperial Russian Army. Discipline today in the Soviet Army is of the strictest and in most cases, of the negative variety. To go off on a comparative tangent for a minute, the Imperial Japanese Army and German Army under Hitler both demanded, to a great extent, negative military adherence. There is one difference, though, in comparison, let us say, with the French Foreign Legion in that there were some political overtones. The Japanese soldier generally was imbued with a fanatic love of the Emperor while Hitler's Army was imbued with the Nazi myth of arianism, etc. Both of these ideologies were irrational but fairly successful coalescing agents. They were a symbol by which all discipline could be explained away. (There is no doubt that the American Army does not do the same but there is always an attempt at rationalization.) The Soviet Army is fast approaching this same level, as the Japanese and German Armies. It is a natural step from blind Party discipline to blind military discipline in terms of the Communist-national ideology. A totalitarian system (as well as an autocracy) demands discipline by definition in order to maintain not only its political-economic existence but its spiritual (myth) existence as well. One might suggest that the Chinese Communist Army will eventually evolve as the Soviet Army has. This is possible and even probable, but there are certain basic differences which will be discussed later.

4. Factors of Discipline:

There are roughly five positive and negative factors which are applied in all armies to produce adherence whether political, military or both.

a. It has already been stated that in the American Army discipline is rationalized. A soldier is in effect told that if he does not conform he is hurting not only himself but the rest of the unit. An American soldier is told time and again that a good unit is one that has good teamwork where each man pulls his share of the load. There is the attempt to tell the American soldier why he is in the Army, why the Army is necessary, and what the Army can do for him. It is made quite plain to him as a recruit that war is tough, dirty, and unpleasant, hence he must be tough and hardened in turn, etc. There is theoretically an over-all attempt to treat the American soldier as a rational, individual, human being. In the Soviet Army this is not true at all. They could not care

less whether the individual soldier understands a regulation or not. (An example: The order issued in 1948 prohibiting fraternization and assigning units to permanent barracks was highly classified and even in the higher echelons no explanation was given or apparently thought necessary.) As a matter of fact there is considerable evidence from the Sponge Reports, etc. that this lack of explanation is one of the major gripes of the enlisted man. He never is told why. Even the political indoctrination given in the Soviet Army does no longer try to explain the why (except perhaps occasionally in very broad terms) of an action or order, but rather this political indoctrination is merely vituperative propaganda aimed at the West, thereby irrationally showing that the Soviet way of life is better.

The Chinese Communist Army, on the other hand, is somewhere in between the American and Soviet Armies on this score. All orders down to the lowest level - whether or not they be action or administrative orders - are explained by the Party leader (or activist) in terms of Communist doctrine and its mission. Looking at this system for a minute from the Chinese Communists' point of view it becomes obvious that they think they are being rational. They think they are giving to the lowly EM the truth. the philosophical difficulty here is that you, no doubt, might say that Communist theory is basically illogical and that the concept of democratic centralism is basically irrational. There is, though, a kind of double negative in this proposition.

b. Esprit de Corps is a fancy phrase for unit loyalty and tradition when applied to an army. The American Army, per se, does not concentrate on this factor to maintain discipline. (There are a few exceptions to this: the "Fighting 69th", later the 165th New York regiment or for instance the 82nd Airborne division. These units to some extent try to instill the unit traditions and build an esprit de corps on past glories.) The best example of this in the United States, of course, is the Marine Corps where tradition is paramount in the indoctrination of a new recruit, who is made patently aware at a very early stage of his training that he is part of an elite corps and that he had better not sully its name.

In the British Army this factor of discipline is paramount; the Guards Brigade, for instance, and various territorial regiments and divisions. All these units have long glorious traditions dating back several centuries. The new recruit is surrounded continually with these symbols and trappings of the past. There is a tendency in the British Army today of a slight loosening

up of these traditions. Now the Soviet Army in this respect is somewhat like ours. They have certain units which have some tradition and on this basis demand esprit de corps, such as the Kalinin Division (stationed in Moscow) or the Third Shock Army (stationed in Germany), but other than these few units, loyalty is not demanded but rather negative military obedience and in some instances political obedience.

In the Chinese Communist Army there is no apparent attempt whatsoever to discipline on the basis of unit loyalty and tradition but rather a soldier's loyalty is and should be to the party and its doctrine.

c. Comradery and friendship are used in different ways in different armies to promote discipline and teamwork.

In the American Army friendship is considered essential and important to the well-being of the social structure of a small unit. Of course there are exceptions when such a comradery, for instance, is of a negative or perhaps neurotic variety. But a non-conformist, non-friendly soldier is to a great extent frowned on. All of these aspects are fairly cynically portrayed in "From Here to Eternity".

In the Soviet Army today friendship or comradery is frowned upon and actually forbidden. One of the defectors spoke of "friendship Soviet style". He broke it down as follows:

- (1) Genuine friendship which is very necessary to most humans and seems to be particularly important - from all evidence - to the Russians. They need what they call a "sympathetic listener". The need for somebody who is willing to listen and sympathize.
- (2) Forced friendship imposed by the officers. This kind is part of the Soviet control system over an individual which will be discussed later.
- (3) Finally friendship Soviet style which means that each individual soldier is forced to be friendly with a man he knows to be an informer - again this will be discussed later.

The main reason apparently that the Soviet Army attempts to regulate comradery in such a manner is to assure, over and above obvious discipline that each individual soldier does not become disenchanted to the extent of both politically and militarily

destroying, or attempting to do so, the unit social structure.

In the Chinese Communist Army it is different again. Comradery is to some extent forced but completely politically. Friendship is condoned and encouraged if it is among the politically mature or between a party activist and a potential recruit. To understand this the social structure of Chinese Communist squad must be briefly analysed. It is a little like an onion. There is the hard core (the cell) of two to three party men lead by the squad leader, who is considered the best party activist. In the next layer or ring will be the Party recruits or neophytes and members of the Youth organization. This might consist of four or five soldiers. The outer ring will contain the neutrals and the non-participants politically. The Chinese Party call the hard core the activists, the first ring the progressives and the second or outer ring the reactionaries. Comradery works from the activists out and is controlled by them. Ostracism, etc. is used to bring the reactionaries in line and if this does not work then strict disciplinary measures are taken. To repeat: the Chinese Communists assume that Party discipline is military discipline. Before leaving this subject there is one point that should be mentioned and that is the factor of public self-criticism which is used extensively in the Chinese Communist Army for disciplinary purposes, just as it is used in all Communist parties. In the Soviet Army this method is occasionally used but the Russian sense of pride and humor (except among the few genuine Party idealists) prohibits this method from being particularly effective especially where negative military discipline has to a great extent replaced Party or political discipline. In the Chinese Communist Army it is different, however, in that the Chinese sense of "face" makes disciplinary tactic of public self-criticism very effective. This is one factor which may make the political structure of the Chinese Communist Army hold up better than it did historically in the Soviet Union.

d. Professionalism is not too an important disciplinary factor at this point in the various Communist Armies. However, there is some evidence both in the Soviet Union and in Communist China that there is an attempt to take young boys from a politically correct background and send them to military academies where after ten to fourteen years they graduate as lieutenants or the equivalent. In the Soviet Union these schools are known as Suvorov Schools

(Nakhimov Schools for the Navy). They are a combination of Culver Military Academy and Westpoint. There is evidence that these schools breed a cold military and political automation - somewhat the equivalent perhaps to the SS graduates in Germany. These young officers are bound to eventually have a profound disciplinary effect on the Soviet Army.

In the American Army professionalism as such, appears to be on the wain. During the 20's and 30's the Army was small in a sense professionally, but what with World War II and the Cold War and hence a large standing army this professionalism has become tempered - although a West Pointer would probably never admit to this.

e. In the Soviet Army very little attention is paid to individual development and advancement, except on an extremely negative basis. (The real exception to this is a man with a high technical education. He will be developed and advanced almost without regard to his political background.) Leaving aside for a minute the opportunist and hypocrit, it is apparent the bulk of enlisted men and officers are not particularly desirous of advancement. When controls are discussed the reason for this will become eminently apparent. Briefly, the higher the level a soldier reaches the more the more the responsibility he will have and at the same time the more conspicuous he will be, hence making him more socially apart, more feared, and more observed. To put it perhaps in another way as he moves up the rank ladder, he becomes more and more stringently disciplined, or at least in the position to be more stringently disciplined. Therefore individual development and advancement can be considered negative in that the more strict and negative the discipline, the less motivation there is for a soldier to advance. On the obverse side, though, the Soviet Army attempts to take those who appear to be politically reliable and develop and advance them; hence the more strict the discipline, the lower the motivation, and in turn the discipline has to become stricter, a vicious circle.

In the Chinese Communist Army this particular factor seems obscure; except there is the apparent fact that those soldiers who are the most politically able, the activists, will be the ones advanced. However, in Korea these men were always in the forefront of an attack and so the losses of good Communists were high. In the American Army (and in other Western Armies) great efforts are made to make the soldier want to develop and advance himself, thereby creating a positive discipline (or self-discipline) factor.

f. Basic needs are an important morale factor in any army hence an important discipline factor. In the American Army there is a kind of paradox emerging on this score. Thanks to psychologists, sociologists, and dieticians, etc. there is a tendency to treat the soldier in a kind of namby-pamby manner. "Make the recruit feel at home!" "Give him Mom's food." The paradox lies in the fact that physical and mental toughness is a very desirable quality in a fighting soldier. Now whether or not this morale building through basic needs, high compensation, etc. is more conducive to producing an effective fighting man than bare minimal needs, etc. is the question. In the Soviet Army (and in the Chinese Communist Army) the needs are minimal: food is adequately nutritional, diversion is adequate to keep a man from going nuts, and so forth. As far as the food is concerned, for instance, in the Soviet Army (and probably in the Chinese Communist Army) it is better, in most cases, than what he would get at home, hence a positive morale factor. Whereas no matter how attractive the mess hall is in the American Army, the food will be, in most cases, worse than what the soldier could get at home. The British Army and French Army are somewhere between with respect to basic needs. Taking food again, in both armies it is minimal as in the Russian Army but at the same time it is worse than home as in the American Army.

This factor of basic needs is a difficult one to apply here in our rough comparative scale. A general corollary though, might be stated as follows: that the more negative the morale the more stringent and negative the discipline, and vice versa.

To conclude this discussion of discipline elements it might be said generally that a fundamentally totalitarian ideology will breed a highly stratified and a very negatively disciplined army. The question that arises is at this point whether the Chinese Communist Army and its Asian confreres will follow this pattern. As we will see later, though, the individual soldier who takes the brunt of this negative discipline is to some extent conditioned to it. To us it seems incredible, to them it seems usual.

5. Control Factors:

Up to now we have sketched several theoretical, as well as actual discipline factors which are used to keep the individual soldier in line. Now, the specific Communist control factors must

be discussed. First, though, it should be pointed out that these control factors, that will be discussed, are common to all Communist national areas (with perhaps a slight change of emphasis); and also that within each Communist National area these control factors are common to all vocations, i.e. industry and collective farms. In essence you should be already aware of this totalitarian triumvirate of control: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of State Security and the Communist Party (for the Ministry of Defense any of the other vocational ministries can be substituted). In any of the vocational ministries, the Party controls through a Political Directorate (or Bureau or Department).

a. How does this control mechanism effect the soldier? (Chart on Control Factors in Communist Armed Forces.) Probably the most basic effect is to produce a completely negative feeling of helplessness (nichevo: could not care less) through a medium of general fear (strakh: an all encompassing fear). The impression is that the individual soldier is continually being observed in a kind of vacuum. Fortunately for him this is not quite true, at least in actuality. The lower the rank the less able the controlling agencies are able to keep a watchful eye. The Russian soldier knows this; hence, as we have already stated, his lack of interest in going up the rank scale. In other words, the lower he is in the structure the more able he is to bury himself in a kind of neutral anonymity. However, the Communist state makes an effort through these control agencies to watch every individual no matter what his station is in life.

b. How does this control mechanism work at the lower unit echelons of the Soviet Army?

(1) Taking the military first, the individual soldier is under virtual life and death control of his commanding officer. Almost all infractions of rules can be summarily dealt with by the commanding officer without the necessity of court martial, etc. The commanding officer, in effect, has informers - the NCO's who hold the responsible position of seeing that orders are fulfilled. This system, you might say, in itself is almost an airtight control. There is though a kind of escape hatch.

(2) The Political Officer or Zampolit (Pampolit) is the official Party representative (down to Company or platoon level). He takes his orders - political orders - through a separate chain of command, the Political Directorate, however, militarily he is under the direction of the unit commander. The prime functions of the Zampolit are to organize and run continuous political indoctrination of his unit, and to check continually on the political reliability of the men in his unit. The Zampolit sees to it that Party committees are formed and functioning right down to squad level. He also secures informants in all units under his political jurisdiction to determine the political climate of each soldier. (Remember the discussion of friendship.) The Party committees in turn may have informants doing the same. Now if a Soviet soldier keeps either completely neutral politically or is willing at least on the surface to show political consciousness, he can go to the Zampolit and use him as our double agents might use the unit Padre. More and more it seems that these Zampolits are becoming sort of a combination Padre and Special Services officer, but with their own chain of command, thereby to some extent nullifying the military control. Finally there is one additional hitch to this in that there is always the chance that a soldier may be forced into the undesirable position of acting as an informant for the Zampolit. This fact would become quickly known in his unit and then his life would become even more lonely and negative.

(3) Independent of both of these control mechanisms is the MVD. The MVD has the CID function in the Armed Forces. (This might change. During the war and up to 1948 they were the "Smersh" units run by the RV, Soviet Army Intelligence. In 1948 their functions were taken over by the MGB, now the MVD.) The MVD acts completely independently of the Military structure of which the Zampolit is a part. Naturally they do not have the force necessary to watch every soldier; so they recruit informants at every level. Theoretically the MVD's function is to see that all Russian soldiers conform to regulations that exist in the area and, of course, in addition to make sure that the integrity and honor of the regime is preserved. But actually they go beyond that. Fortunately for the soldier at any level they are not that efficient but in many ways the most dangerous of the control elements.

They are inefficient due to lack of time and personnel. They are dangerous because each MVD officer is forced to produce so much information (he has a quota to full-fill), so naturally he passes this burden on to his informants. The informants in an effort to please are very often forced to fabricate, thereby creating derogatory information about a soldier which is untrue. The only hope for this individual is that nothing will be done about this information. It is always there, though, in his dossier. When he leaves the army and returns home this information will be in MVD files of the Voenkomat (The Raion government). It might or might not make it difficult for him to get a work permit.

(4) In all of this control system the Russian soldier's chief hope for peace and quiet is the vast red tape confusion which exists in every overblown bureaucracy. If you read the Rand Report and Sponge Reports, you will see that in the end it is not a particularly efficient control system, nevertheless it is always there and hence it produces a very definite psychological climate.

c. In the Chinese Communist Army there are some differences:

(1) The political officer has equal status with the unit commander; hence through the medium of the social structure of the small unit, as has been described, he has tremendous control power. In other words the emphasis - to repeat - is completely political.

(2) There is some doubt as to whether or not there exists an equivalent to the MVD at least vis-a-vis the Army. Keep in mind that the State structure in China is not fully developed. The revolution has to be consolidated and this is a function of the Party. The Bureau of Social Affairs in the party element (subordinate to the Central Committee) has a watchdog, CE function similar to the MVD and it is suspected that they are directly responsible for the investigation and surveillance of the Political Bureau of the People's Revolutionary Military Council. This again shows the preeminence of the Party.

d. Concluding, it is apparent that these controls are a part of the life pattern of every individual within a Communist state; hence their behavior is bound to be effected. Some of these will be discussed to try and show the strength and weaknesses of the system.

6. Educational, Recruitment and Training Factors:

To shift emphasis for a minute, how does a young Soviet Citizen get into the Army? All Communist Nations have compulsory military service for two to five years for eighteen year olds. The selection is done on the "class" basis as in all other European countries. All the draft records, etc. are kept at the Raion level by the Voenkomat. First let us take a Russian young man through the procedure.

a. Education:

(1) Elementary Schools; 4 years; basic schools and in a great many rural areas this is still all the education a boy or girl will get.

(2) Seven Year Schools; 7 years; this is the most common school in the Soviet Union. The government is attempting to make these schools standard. The curriculum roughly equivalent to the French Lycee, except a heavy dose of basic Communist doctrine.

(3) Secondary Schools; 10 years; these are common to all large urban areas. They are for the better students who will go on to the Universities. A good student may be shifted from a 4 year or 7 year school to one of these 10 year schools by the state with all expenses paid.

(4) FZO Schools; 2,3,4 years; vocation schools run by the Ministry of Labor; Labor Reserve Schools.

b. Drafting:

(1) Voenkomat of the Raion. The Voenkomat is part of the county government, as well as the military recruiting and recording office. Consists of (usually): Chief of the Military office - chairman, representative of the Raion Government, representatives of the MVD, and two physicians.

(2) The Voyenkomat records a man's life history and details describing his social and educational background. The first phase consists of notifying a young man to report (usually around 6 to 7 A.M.). He is briefly checked politically and given a cursory medical examination.

(3) Second phase comes a few weeks (sometimes a month) later when he is asked to report to the Voyenkomat, when he is given a more thorough medical examination. Each Voyenkomat has quotas to fill from Army, Navy, and Air. The healthier and more educated young men will or might at this time get singled out as potential recruits for the airforce or navy (the elite corps.) There is some evidence that a draftee may state a preference but more than likely it does not signify a great deal.

(4) Third phase comes anywhere from several weeks to several months later when the draftee is ordered to report to the Voyenkomat collection center.

c. Selection of Branch of Service and NCO's:

(1) This final selection of branch of service and NCO's is done at the Voyenkomat collection center.

(2) The elements of selection are education, political background, general fitness (combatant or non-combatant) and the quotas to be filled for the various services.

(3) For potential air and navy recruits there seem to be Assessment Commissions (Atestsia) which do the final screening. (It is not known whether these are in all Voyenkomats or whether only in the greater urban areas, i.e. Moscow, Leningrad.) The commissions give another medical examination and skill assessment (psychotechnical). They investigate a recruit's civilian life (social) and test his political background.

(4) The cream of the draftees go to the airforce, navy, and various technical branches of the army.

(5) Potential NCO material will be called at this time.

(6) In the army (air and navy have their own basic training facilities) there is a common Basic Training policy for all draftees. The NCO material then goes to NCO schools. (NCO's may be chosen at a later date.)

d. Selection of Officers:

(1) This initially is done the same way, as has just been discussed; however, a draftee must have 10 years of schooling. (Sometimes 7 years is adequate for an infantry officer.) He must pass an education and political examination (an entrance examination) before he is admitted to one of many different types of Officers Schools (equivalent to OCS).

(2) What kind of Officers Schools will be determined by the candidate's pre-military education. If he attended an FZO school (where he would have had some para-military training) he might be sent to an Officers School for Motor Transport, etc.

(3) NCO's are continually screened for potential officer material.

(4) Graduates of Suvorov (and Nakhimov schools) automatically become officers. These boys, formerly war orphans now sons of army officers, are given 10 years of general and military training. Then they go on directly to Officers Schools.

e. Political Factors in Selection:

(1) Up to 1937 only men of proletarian or semi-proletarian ancestry were eligible for NCO or officer's rank. Priests, kulaks, etc. were excluded.

(2) After 1937 this was eased except for the Airforce Navy, Signal Corps, Tank Corps and other elite groups.

(3) Social background, as well as political, is investigated. Today if a candidate comes from an ethnic are inimical to the Soviet Union he has less chance of advancement.

f. In conclusion there are few additional points that might be mentioned to round out your reading:

(1) An officer in the Soviet Army must go through many schools in order to be moved up the ladder. In this respect it is very similar to the American Army. The Frunze Academy is equivalent to the War College. Each branch of the service has its schools, i.e. Voroshilov Academy for Artillery, Lenin Academy for Political Officers.

(2) A Political Officer (Zampolit) is chosen from a unit by the political directorate from those regular NCO's and officers who have good political records. He is detached from his unit and sent to a Political Officer's School.

(It should be mentioned that the Chinese Communist methods of recruitment, etc. are vague and confused. There is virtually no data on this.)

7. The Apparent Elements of General Cultural Development:

In your reading you have come across various cultural traits which are always applied to various nationalities: the Italians are volatile and sexy; the Swedish are cold and reserved and so forth. Now these general statements are true insofar as general subjective observation can be over a long period of time. Anyway I am sure many of you have thought of or even discussed these cultural behavior patterns. For instance many of you may have heard of "momism" as applied to the flower of American manhood. There must be some truth to this general American habit of worshipping "mom" in that the Chinese Communist interrogators used it very successfully for propaganda purposes amongst the American POW's in Korea. Now presumably the Russians (the Great Russians) have distinctive cultural traits and also the Chinese must have the same. The weight of evidence is such that one can only come to the conclusion that they do. If you accept this fact, then it is obvious that this general behavior will effect individual behavior and vice-versa (there is socio-cultural interaction between the individual and group and the group and the individual); therefore, it will do no harm to briefly mention some of the behaviour patterns, particular to the Great Russians and the Chinese keeping in mind their effect on the behaviour of the soldier:

a. Endurance: both the Russians and the Chinese seem to have the ability to withstand tremendous hardships. The cause of this would appear to be environmental (and perhaps socio-economic). In the 1830's in the West of U.S.A. the so-called "mountain men" seemed to have this equal ability. The Russians and the Chinese can go from below minimum food consumption over a protracted period and then gorge themselves when food is plentiful, in an absolutely phenomenal way.

b. Comradeliness: both the Russians and the Chinese, but in particular the former, need what the Russians call a "sympathetic listener"; someone who is "sympatico", preferably with a

member of the same sex. This comrade will be more than just a listener in that he can be trusted absolutely to protect his fellow comrade from the long arm of the totalitarian (or autocratic) regime.

c. Fear: both the Russians and the Chinese have this kind of fear - this time the emphasis is on the Chinese. The Russians call it "strakh", the Chinese call it "face". It is fear of public shame. It is not so much a physical fear as a mental one. It is the fear of being shamed, losing pride and honor, losing dignity and of losing friends, of being alone.

d. Subordination: both the Russians and the Chinese believe that it is not so much what their superiors do but how they do it. A Russian peasant does not fundamentally object to being physically punished if it is done in a paternalistic manner. If it is done in a sadistic, unpleasant, unfair manner then the willing subordination breaks down. There was no objection to landlords or officers if they abided by this rule. Stalin became during World War II kind of a paternalistic symbol of this idea.

e. Emotional Extremes: the Russians in particular are well known for this general behaviour. (The South Chinese, Cantonese, are said to have elements of this behaviour also.) If one reads Dostoevski, Pushkin, Tolstoi, and Turgenyev and others, one immediately becomes aware of this phenomenon -- going from almost hysterical happiness and activity to the depths of the "slough of despond". The Russians, themselves, have several categories of this behaviour pattern:

(1) Oblomovism: Oblomov was a character in a Russian novel who spent his entire life in his bathrobe in his bedroom, alternating between complete inactivity and anti-socialness and fits of tremendous activity and socialness; but on the whole, life was too awful, hence the confines of his slovenly bedroom became his ivory tower.

(2) Nichevo attitude: "could not care less"; the line of least resistance; a kind of psychological inversion to escape the difficulties and unpleasantness of life.

Both of these seem to be recognized by the Russians themselves. One of the interesting manifestations of this emotionalism is the endless stories about drinking in Russia. The Great Russians are well known for their vodka capacity and also their love of it. (The Swedish have this reputation also.) The Communist regime has tried in many areas - including the Armed Forces - to establish a kind of prohibition but it does not seem to really work. In Moscow the city police run places called "sobering up stations"; hence a recognition of the Russian proclivity for liquor.

f. Absolutes: both the Russians and Chinese seem to have this highly developed desire to have conceptual absolutes. This is partly due, I think, to a religious residue which exists in both countries. In Russia you had the Orthodox Church with its spiritual absolutes and in China you had Confucianism with its dogma. Communism with its hard anti-fast credo fills this vacuum, which might partially explain the success of Totalitarian Communism in these cultures.

(SEE CHART)

If we look at the social structure prior to the Communist revolutions in both countries and compare them with the present structure, there is very little difference. The peasant is roughly in the same position as he was in time immemorial. The only major change is the forcible creation of a so called "proletariat" which tends to change the traditional economic continuum but the traditions of social and political control remain the same, which leads one to the thought that a study of pre-revolutionary Russia and China will give us clues to present day behaviour, and after all behaviour by an individual or group is the main cause of CIA existence.